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DIDEROT'S UNCLE,
HEGEL
Or, Rameau's Nephew
as a Branch of
The Phenomenology of Spirit
Isabelle C. DeMarte and J. M. Fritzman

Since each of us, like anyone else, is already various people, it
gets rather crowded.^
To insert Rameau's Nephew into the Phenomenologf is to wrap a
riddle in an enigma. For if Rameau's Nephew is a frequently
puzzling book, the difficulties of the Phenomenohgf are
legendary. It has annoyed generations of readers, beginning
with its own author. In a letter written to ScheUing shortly
after its publication Hegel bemoaned the "wretched
confusion" that had reigned during the writing, publishing,
printing, and distribution of the book and begged forgiveness
for the "want of form in the last sections" of the work. Into
the midst of this confusion Hegeldropped Rameau's eccentric
nephew.^

' Gilles 'Dt\txa,e,Negoiiations: 1972—1990, translated by Martinjoughin (NewYork: Columbia
University Press, 1995), 7.
^ JamesSchmidt, "The Fool's Truth: Diderot, Goethe, and HegciP Journal of the Histo^ of Ideas
57 (1996): 629.
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^ PROGRAM NOTES *

iderot begins Rameau's Nephew in the 1760s, and
revises it during the next twelve years. However, he
never publishes it, never mentions it in any letter or
diary, or never tells anyone about it. After Diderot's death in 1784, his
library is sent to Catherine the Great in Russia. Rameau's Nephew goes
too, lost among the other manuscripts, letters, and books. In Russia,
someone finds Rameau's Nephew, and makes a copy of it. This copy is
smu^led into Jena in 1804. Schiller reads it, and gives it to Goethe,
whose translation is published in 1805. Only a few people read
Goethe's translation. Hegel is one of them. He incorporates passages
of Ruimeau's Nephew into the "Self-Alienated Spirit" section in his 1807
Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel paraphrases and quotes, uses quotation
marks, but cites neither book nor author, and so "imperiously ignores
all the rules for using quotes."^ Further, he creates montages by linking
passages from different sections. Hegel contrasts the "disrupted
consciousness" of the Nephew with the Philosopher's "plain mind."
History, according to Hegel, is on the side of the Nephew. This is so,
to simplify matters, because the dismpted consciousness realizes that
everything is vanity, including itself, whereas the plain mind cannot see
this.
Diderot's Rximeau's Nephew exhibits a dialogue between two
persons, the narrator (Moi) and the Nephew of Rameau (f-,ui). This
second person is sufficiently obscure that Schiller and Goethe assume
that he is an entirely fictional character. Not so. Jean-Francois Rameau
is the nephew of Jean-Philippe Rameau, thegreat composer. If Hulbert
exaggerates in asserting that "when we believe that we are reading a life
we are always reading a text," historical persons still never go into their
literary counterparts without remainder.'' Nevertheless, the following
description of Jean-Frangois Rameau appUes to LMS too:

' Hans Robert Jauss, "The Dialogjcal and the Dialectical Neveu De 'Rameau: How Diderot
Adopted Socrates and Hegel Adopted Diderot," Protocol of the Colloquy of the Center for
Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modem Cultures: 27 February 1983, volume 45 (Berkeley:
Center for Hermeneutical Smdies in Hellenistic and Modem Cultures), 23.
James Hulbert, "Diderot in the Text of Hegel; A Question of Intertextuality," Studies in
'Romanticism 22 (1983); 270.
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Rameau's sallies were instructive sallies They were not bons
mots-, they were remarks that seemed to spring from the most
perfect understanding of the human heart. His appearance,
which was tmly burlesque, gave an extraordinary piquancy to
his jokes, which were all the more unexpected since he
normally played the part of a madman. This person, born a
musician like his uncle, never plumbed the depths of the art,
but he was born full of song and had a strange facility for
finding, quite impromptu, an agreeable and expressive setting
for any words that you gave him....He was horribly and
comically ugly and very often a bore, for his genius inspired
him only on rare occasions, but if the verve came to him, he
could make you laugh till you cried That strange man
nursed a passion for glory and never found any way of
attaining it.^
is also a sycophant, a swindler, a sponger, a parasite, a nihilist, a
libertine, a liar, and a charlatan. He is, no doubt, like many others. The
Nephew differs from them in that he is completely frank about what
he does and about the principles, those of wealth and power, that he
follows. He gives voice, and openly admits, to what others secretly
think and do. Moreover, whereas others unconsciously inhabit various
roles and jobs in society—or, as the Nephew expresses this, they take
positions and play pantomimes—^he expUcidy understands the nature
of human mutual dependence, and he uses this knowledge to promote
his interests.
Nevertheless, the Nephew is a concatenation of contradictions.
He despises geniuses, but desperately wants to be one. He says that aU
that matters is that the bowels move regularly, while he wants to
accomplish something that wiU last. He claims that he is prepared to
do anything out of self-interest, yet he gratuitously insults the rich
family with whom he lives and so is expelled from their home. He
then indignantly refuses to apologize because that would be beneath his
human dignity, although he also prides himself on never allowing
considerations of dignity to interfere with material gain.

'Jacques Cazotte; cited in P. N. Furbank, Diderot: A Critical hiography (New York, Aifred A.
Knopf, 1992), 243.
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The Nephew refers to his interlocutor as "master Philosopher."
The Philosopher represents the moral and intellectual values of the
Enlightenment. like Plato, he believes in the true, the good, and the
beautiful. The dialogue between the Nephew and the Philosopher,
however, is a topsy-turvy inversion of a platonic dialogue. Whereas
Socrates successfully defends the true, the good, and the beautiful
against the sophists' attacks, the Philosopher is unable to respond
effectively to the Nephew's comments. Socrates replies with
arguments, the Philosopher can only change the subject. The
Philosopher can do no better, finally, than recommend the example of
Diogenes, Uving naked in a tub, eating whatever vegetables and fruits
nature provides. The Nephew shows the Philosopher that, although
he wishes to deny it, he too participates in the Nephew's principles.

^ INTRODUCTION *
The jacket was tight and the trousers were too short, but
it made me feel younger than I was, and somehow enabled
me to do things that I would ordinarily fear undertaking: I
could be young and immature, fearless and naive. I love the
way clothes have the power to change the mind that inhabits
them: that's why I became interested in designing them with
Vivienne. People normally wear a uniform to reflect their
job or their role in Ufe: as banker, secretary, lawyer, or
garbage collector.
Even painters have a particular
uniform—that bohemian style. Fashion, used as a disguise,
allows you to be something you're not. It is much more
difficult to use fashion to express who you really are.*^
Moderator. It is as unusual as it is pleasing for three talks
to discuss Hegel's relation to Diderot. At the last moment,
unfortunately, "Hegel's Sublime Sublation of Diderot" had to be
canceled. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that, if the remaining
two papers function in the appropriate dialectical fashion, the
canceled paper wiU be preserved as their implicit synthesis.
' Malcolm McLaren, "Elements of Anti-Style," The New Yorker (22 September 1997): 93.
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The first paper is entitled "Consciousness' Shape as Social Context."
The second paper, after the briefest of intermissions, will be "Hegel's
Nephew, Diderot." This will be followed with a reception at the
Faculty Club.

^ ACT I: CONSCIOUSNESS' SHAPE
AS SOCIAL CONTEXT *
To claim that a creative writer shows less talent when he does not
invent his subject would be pure nonsense. Diderot was able to take
a character from the world around him and make him live and breathe.
But he is no mere portraitist He saw in Jean-Frangois not only the
individual but the type, not only the isolated case but its universal
implications. We may believe that he had the genius to make of a
brilliant dialogue with the historical Jean-Francois a biting satire of the
groups and beliefs of the society which his interlocutor so well
represented.^

ACT I, SCENE 1 *
Substantially elaborating on the reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
first articulated in Lukacs' Young Hegel, Forster argues that this text
presents three chronological treatments of the course of history.® First,
the chapters Consciousness through Reason narrate that history from the
perspective of individual shapes of consciousness. Second, the chapter
on Spirit focuses on the social contexts in which those shapes of
consciousness are situated. According to Hegel:
Spirit is the ethical life oidi nation in so far as it is the immediate
truth—the individual that is a world. It must advance to the
consciousness of what it is immediately, must leave behind it
the beauty of ethical life, and by passing through a series of

' Milton F. Seiden, "Jean-Francois Rameau and Diderot's Neveu," Diderot Studies1 (1949): 183.
* CompareGeorg Lukacs, TheYoungHegek Studies in the 'Relations between Dialectics and 'Economics,
translated by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976).
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shapes attain to a knowledge of itself. These shapes,
however, are distinguished from the previous ones by the
fact that they are real Spirits, actualities in the strict meaning
of the word, and instead of being shapes merely of
consciousness, are shapes of a world.^

Having provided textual evidence to support this interpretation, Forster
writes that "it is, then, pretty clear that the officially intended design of
the Spirit chapter is that it should give a second chronological treatment
of history focusing on the sequence of 'Spirits' or social contexts
associated with the shapes of consciousness whose chronological history
has already been told in the chapters Consriousness through Reason.''^^
Finally, the Reason
Absolute Knonnng chapters examine the attempts
to articulate God's nature, or that of the Absolute, through art, religion,
and philosophy, culminating in the philosophy of Hegel.
The correlations between the first two chronological treatments
of history are less than perfect, according to Forster, and so they do not
conform to Hegel's intended design. Specifically, the second half of
the Spirit chapter does not correspond to the relevant sections in the
chapter on Reason. Forster maintains that there are two ways in which
Hegel's procedurein the Spirit chaptet deviates from his official design.
First, the section of the Reason chapter that discusses modern German
developments should have a corresponding discussion in the Spirit
chapter of the social context of those developments. Instead, Hegel
provides an account of modem French developments. Rather than an
investigation of the social context of the German developments,
Forster maintains that the Spirit chapter instead represents a rewriting
of the earlier discussion in Reason by giving an alternative account, this
time focusing attention on developments in France.
The second way in which the Spirit chapter departs from Hegel's
official design is that, having concluded the section on "Culture and Its
Real of Actuality," Hegel describes various shapes of consciousness
rather than social contexts, except for his discussion of the French

' Georg W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1977), §441,265.
Michael N. Forster, Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1998), 448.
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Revolution in the "Absolute Freedom and Terror" section.'^ In this
context, Forster notes Hegel's quoting from and paraphrasing of
passages in Diderot's Ramau's Nephew. Forster concludes that "the
later parts of the Spirit chapter deviate from its officially intended
design because they in effect abandon that design in order to undertake
a rewriting of the later parts of the Reason chapter, a rewriting of them
identifying a different species of historical representation for a similar
series of development in thought."^^
Hegel's discussion in the Spirit chapter does not, pace Forster,
deviate from his official design.'^ To see this, it is crucial to invert
Forster's argument. Rather than taking Hegel's discussions—of (i) the
social context of developments in France rather than those in
Germany, and (ii) shapes of consciousness instead of social
contexts—as evidence that Hegel departs from his design, it is
necessary to ask a seemingly naive question: Since Hegel indeed follows
his official design, what must that design be, given (i) and (ii)? The first
half of the answer is that, incredible as it may appear, the social context
for German developments is not in Germany but in France. The
answer's second half, no less surprising, is that the social context of the
shapes of consciousness is presented through those shapes themselves.
Demonstrating the correcmess of this answer will require a few
moments. The second half is the easier to show, and so it wiU be
addressed first.

* ACT I, SCENE 2 ^
That Hegel presents the social context of the shapes of consciousness
by means of those shapes themselves can be seen by attending to an
exemplary instance of this, Hegel's incorporation in the Rhenomenologf
of Spirit of Diderot's Rameau's Nephew. In Diderot's dialogue, the
Nephew is not only a particular shape of consciousness, he also
exhibits his social context. Seiden recognizes this when he writes that

" Forster, Hegel's Idea of a fhenomenolog) of Spirit, 451-52.
Forster, Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenolog) of Spirit, 452.
" If this paper sees farther than Forster's text, this is because it stands on the shoulders of
that magisterial giant.
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"it is evident from Diderot's remarks that he sees the Nephew as
representative of the society of his day."" In addition to being an
extraordinary individual, Diderot presents the Nephew as revealing his
society." The Nephew is the epitome, or a mise en ai^m, of his social
context. Depicting him this way, Diderot was able to provide a critique
of his society. As Josephs writes: "By identifying himself with the
whole of contemporary Parisian society, Rameau reveals the ugly truth
of a decaying culture. Throughout the dialogue, Rameau's social
criticism is effected precisely by means of this boastful display of his
own corruption."" His expertise at pantomime, moreover, allows the
Nephew to limn all of the positions within his society.
Diderot employs the Nephew to show and criticize his society, and
so it is clear that Hegel uses Diderot's Rameau's Nephew to exhibit a
social context, and not merely a shape of consciousness. This is further
supported by two points. First, citing neither title nor author, Hegel
does not reveal the source from which he quotes and paraphrases. This
shows that Hegel is not interested in a specific shape of consciousness,
but rather in the social context that this shape exemplifies. Second,
following Schiller and Goethe, Hegel would assume that the Nephew
is not a historical person, but entirely a literary creation of Diderot. It
is even more certain, therefore, that Hegel sees the character of the
Nephew as embodying his society.

* ACT I, SCENE 3 ^
As seen above, Forster charges that the later parts of Hegel's chapter
on
abandon his officially intended design. Rather than provi^ng
the social context of modem German developments depicted in the

^ Seiden, "Jean-Francois Rameau and Diderot's Neveu" 174.
Seiden, "Jean-Francois Rameau and Diderot's Neveu" 177: "The use of the Nephew as an
example of society and thus the Neveu de 'Rameau as a criticism of such society is shown by
comments Diderot makes about his interlocutor. He writes: 'II n'etait ni plus ni moins
abominable qu'eux, 11 etait seulement plus franc et plus consequent, et quelquefois profond
dans sa depravation [Neither more nor less abominable than others, he was only franker and
more consistent, and occasionally profound in his depravity].' These characteristics are not
just those of a small group, but underlie society in the nation as a whole."
Herbert Josephs, Diderot's Dialogue of language and Gesture: he Neveu de "Rameau, (Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 1969), 158-59.
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Reason chapter, Hegel instead rewrites that chapter, now discussing
modern French developments. Although Forster sees that Hegel
beUeves that German thought is divided, he does not recognize the
extent of that division. This diremption is so extreme that the social
context of Germany is not in Germany, as expected, but instead in
France. Put another way, the social context in France is also the
context (^Germany. The context for German political change is also
in France. That context does not dwell in Germany, but rather in
France, in the person of Napoleon. As Forster perceives, Hegel does
not believe that an answer to Germany's divided consciousness will
arise internally. Rather, a solution will be imposed externally, via
Napoleon. Stated more accurately, Hegel believes that Napoleon will
impose the relevant social context that wiU allow the Phenomenologji of
Spirit to overcome and heal the divided consciousness of Germany.
Supplying an exhaustive comparison of the Reason and Spirit
chapters—one that would demonstrate in each case that Hegel has
provided every shape of consciousness with its appropriate social
context—^is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the alleged
instances of rewriting that Forster claims to discern wiU be examined.
It win suffice to show that, in these instances, the Spirit chapter
presents the social contexts for the shapes of consciousness given in
the chapter on Reason.
Forster gives three instances of Hegel's supposed deviation from
his officially intended design. First, the Reason chapter's section on
"Pleasure and Necessity" uses Goethe'sVaustto portray how modern
consciousness, responding to the implicit idealism of the natural
sciences foregoes any theoretical understanding of the objective world
in favor of the search for pleasure. The
chapter's section on "The
Truth of the Enlightenment" does not provide the social context for
this, but instead "reidentifies basically the same development in
thought with the Enlightenment and its principle of Utility or the
Usefiil."^^
Second, Forster claims that the section on "The Law of
the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit" in Reason employs
Schiller's Robbers to illustrate the shape of consciousness where
individuals ignore communal norms, asserting conscience to be

' Forster, Htgel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit, 452.
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the moral law's immediate source, and the disastrous
consequences of this. The section on "Absolute Freedom and
Terror" in Spirit instead "associates the very same; development
in thought with the French Revolution, and in particular
Robespierre."'^
Finally, Reason'^ sections on "Virtue and the Way of the World,"
and "The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and Deceit, or the 'Matter in
Hand' Itself," on Forster's interpretation, view Frederick the Great as
responsible for restraining individualism while promoting a renewed
regard for the community's values, and Herder's philosophy as leading
to a more communal attitude. Spirits section on "Absolute Freedom
and Terror," in contrast, "reassigns the same developments to the
Jacobin Terror of 1793, which is similarly described as disciplining
unbridled individualism and restoring individuals to deference toward
their community and its functional roles."''
As it was shown above, Hegel's incorporation of Ramau's Nephew
into the Phemmenolo^ of Spirit siilows what initially appear only as shapes
of consciousness to also serve as social contexts. So, there is no need
to repeat that argument. Forster's claims would be unanswerable if
provided only the social contexts of the shapes of consciousness
presented in Reason. As Hegel explains, however, "Reason is Spirit
when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is
conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself."
Moreover, Hegel continues, spiritual essence which "is in and for itself
and which is at the same time actual as consciousness and aware of
itself, this is Spirit."^ The chapter on Spirit is concerned with social
context, to be sure, but it also chronicles how persons become explicitly
aware of the results achieved in the Reason chapter. This process of
making explicit accounts for the sections that Forster regards as
instances of rewriting.
So, in the Reason chapter's section on "Pleasure and Necessity,"
modern consciousness looses any theoretical interest in the natural
world, choosing instead to pursue pleasure. The
chapter's section
on "The Truth of the Enlightenment" not only provides the social

Foister, Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit, 453.
" Forster, Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit, 453.
® Flegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §438,263.
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context for this, but Hegel's discussion of the Enlightenment and its
principle of Utility or the Useful also explains how such a process
becomes intelligible to those who undergo this experience.
Second, the section on "The Law of the Heart and the Frenzy of
Self-Conceit" in Reason illustrates the disastrous consequences that
occur when individuals, flouting the values of their community, assert
that each individual's conscience is the immediate source of the moral
law. In the section on "Absolute Freedom and Terror" in Spirit,
however, those who are educated by the French Revolution come to
imderstand this lesson.
Finally, Reason's sections on "Virtue and the Way of the World,"
and "The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and Deceit, or the 'Matter in
Hand' Itself sees individualism restrained and a regard for communal
norms promoted. There, these are experienced only as external
impositions. In Spirits section on "Absolute Freedom and Terror,"
persons comprehend how individualism leads directly to the Terror, as
well as recognize the need to restrain that individualism and to accept
the social differentiation of roles.

^ ACT I, SCENE 4 ^
Diderot never publishes Rameau's Nephew. Hidden among his other
papers, it travels to Russia. There, it is discovered, copied, and
smuggled into Germany. Goethe translates and publishes it in 1805,
just when Hegel is writing his chapter on Spirit. In turn, Hegel
incorporates this text to exhibit the social context of modern German
developments. The context of modern German developments is not
in Germany, but in France. Nevertheless, that context's truth is not in
France, but back in Germany.
There is no better illustration of two of Hegel's crucial insights.
What is initially a purely fortuitous and contingent act becomes neces
sary once it takes its place within the dialectic—a place that, viewed
retrospectively, had always already been prepared for it.^^ Thought

Compare Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Thilosopty of History, trans. J. Sibree (New
York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), 257—58. There, Hegel explains that in the Persian
Wars, "the interest of the World's History hung trembling in the balance. Oriental
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does not develop organically or internally, this is the second insight, but
instead is a response to some external event. Like people, spirit only
thinks when compelled.^^ Nevertheless, to add a final turn to the
screw, when spirit teM its story about this, the kick it received from the
world will have been transfigured into a necessary moment in its own
self-development—and so back to the first insight.
And so back to Diderot, as this is how his dialogue starts. The
Philosopher claims that "such eccentrics" as the Nephew are worth
"no great esteem." Nevertheless, he also concedes that"their character
stands out from the rest and breaks that tedious uniformity which our
education, our social conventions, and our customary good manners
have brought about." Put otherwise, persons such as the Nephew
arrest the Philosopher's wandering thoughts and throw them into a
whirlpool of speculation. Indeed, the Philosopher compares him to
"yeast that ferments and restores to each of us a part of his native
individuality."^ The Nephew's appearance at the beginning of the
dialogue is one such eccentric yet compelling external kick, one that
forces the Philosopher to think.

^ INTERMISSION ^
Je sais aussi m'aliener; talent sans kquel on ne fait rien qui vaille?*

despotism—a world united under one lord and sovereign—on the one side, and separate
states—insignificant in extent and resources, but animated byfree individuality—on theother
side, stood firont to firont in array of battle."
^ Compare Hegel, Phenomenolog of Spirit, §32,19: "Death... is of all things most dreadful, and
to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength. Lacking strength. Beauty hates the
Understanding for asking of her what it cannot do. But the life of the Spirit is not the life that
shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures
it and maintains itself in it. It wins its tmth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds
itself....Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face,and tarrying with it. This
tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it into being."
^ Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," Pameau's Nephm and Other Works, trans. Jacques Barzun
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 10.
Denis Diderot, (Euvres Completes, volume 7, Jules Assezat, ed. (Paris: Gamier Freres,
Libraires-Editeurs, 1875), 404; translatiom 'T know how to alienate myself too; without this
talent, one will do nothing worthwhile."
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HE; Amo te,it's a lovely day! Speakingof getting our kicksin the world and thinkingabout
it later, we could....
SHE: Don't go there!
HE: I won't. Nowhere near. I'll go get a cookie. Bring you some coffee.
SHE: Good. I met Forster once.
HE: Really?
SHE: At a philosophy conference in Chicago. It was a tremendous honor, but I don't
think he fully appreciated it.
HE; Touche.
SHE: Serves you right.
HE: It probably does. I thought that the part of the paper claiming that the Nephew
represents his social context was rather clever. A person might so thoroughly embody the
tendencies and conditions of the age that the thought and life of that individual offer the
clearest window to the time. Oscar Wilde would be a good example. Wilde said of himself
that he was so typical a child of his age that, in his perversity and for that sake of his
perversity, he turned the good things of his life to evil, and the evil things to good. In any
case. Mot and La/' aren't the world-historical individuals that Hegel discusses in his Phihsoply
qfHistoiy. The actions of those individuals fundamentally change their world. In contrast,
social-context individuals, to introduce an infelicitous expression, don't alter but rather
reflect their societies.
SHE: I wasn't aware that there'd be a lecture during the intermission. I'm quite sure the
Program Notes didn't mention it. An extra treat, I suppose.
HE: Nice. But I don't find at all plausible the claim that the social context of Germany
is in France. It just seems counter-intuitive, odd, and probably wrong to say that the social
context of a shape of consciousness might be geographically distinct from that shape's
location.
SHE; That's a failure of imagination on your part.
HE: How so?
SHE; Not understanding why is another failure.
HE: Score two points for you.
SHE: Three. Dialectically, two points count for one too.
HE: Three points then. Fine. Why do you believe that the social context of German
developments could be in France?
SHE: Think of it this way. It frequently happens that the conditions in one place are the
result ofactions that occur elsewhere, along with thoseactions' concomitant socialcontext.
Florida's election laws about ballot counting, for instance. It wouldn't be too much of a
stretch to claim that events in some third world countries are the result of the social
context in the U.S.
HE: I still don't find this especially plausible.
SHE: Maybe you don't have to. There's another argument that supports the same
conclusion. Since it's hard for me to believe that you were paying attention during the talk,
let me remind you of some of the main points.
HE: Well, I was paying attention to some things....
SHE: Behave, will you? Now, Forster maintains that Hegel's Spirit chapter
deviates from his official design. The Spirit chapter gives an account of modem
French developments, whereas Hegel's official design calls for a presentation of the
social context of the modem German developments that are discussed in the
sections of the Peason chapter. Forster's argument presupposes that those sections
of Reason discuss only German developments. If Hegel is also concerned with
modem French developments, however, this would strongly surest that the Spirit
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chapter is not rewriting the sections in Reason, and that the discussion in the Spirit
chapter presents the social context of the sections in Reason. Terry Pinkard's analysis
shows that Hegel is discussing both German and French developments in the sections
in Reason.
HE: Now who's giving a lecture?
SHE; I am, since you're not clever enough to help make this argument. So...as a
consequence of the failures of Faustian hedonism, chronicled in the "Pleasure and
Necessity" section, a new shape of consciousness arises in the next section, "The Law of
the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit" Pinkard writes that Hegel's "use of the phrase,
'the law of the heart' is most likely an oblique reference to Pascal and his involvement with
Jansenism." Pinkard further maintains that "Pascal's notion of reason's recognition of
its limits in the 'law of the heart'...fits the model of agency and authoritativeness that
Hegel discusses." However, H. S. Harris claims that "it is clear that the embodied Gestalt
of the 'law of the heart' is Rousseau."^^ I needn't decide whether Pinkard or Harris is
right—^and it's entirely possible that they're both correct, since Hegel could be referring
to Pascal and Rousseau. In any event, Pascal and Rousseau are both French.
HE: Okay, I get the picture. Let me help. Following the analysis in "The Law of the
Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit" section, doesn't Hegel next discuss the opposition
between "Virtue and the Way of the World"?
SHE: That's right.
HE: Impressed?
SHE: Yes. At Hegel.
HE: Nice. As I was saying: Virtue conflicts with the way of the world when the French
philosophes, influenced by the Earl of Shaftsbury's doctrine of natural virtue, attempt to
integrate the "law of the heart" and the notion of the impartiality of reason.^^ Pinkard
discerns, moreover, a reference to Cervantes' character Don Quixote when Hegel claims
that the stru^le of the "knight of virtue" against the "way of the world" is no more than
a "sham-fight"which the knight—^believing both that virtue will prevail naturally, and that
virme does not require the knight's efforts on its behalf—"cannot take,seriously" and "dare
not allow to become serious." See, I've read Pinkard's book too.
SHE: Nice to know you can read. I should tell you, though, that Harris disagrees with
Pinkard: "It cannot be said too often, or too emphatically, that the Knight of Virtue is not
Don Quixote." Harris believes that "Cervantes' hero is a fascinating portrait of 'faith'; and
as such he is an enemy of 'Reason' in all its 'shapes.' All that he shares with 'Reason' is
the confidence that God's Will can be done on earth....As an individual the Don fits 'the
Heart' better than 'Virtue.'" 30 Not only have I read Pinkard and Harris, but I can quote
too.
HE: Hiss.

Terry Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenolog/: The Sodality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 99. Compare Hegel, Phenomnology of Spirit, §367,221.
^ Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenoloff, 100.
^ H.S. Harris, Hegel's Ladder, Volume 11: The Oefyss^ of Spirit (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1997), 34.
Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenology, 105-6.
® Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenology, 109; compare Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §386, 231.
Harris, Hegel's Ladder II, 74—75.
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SHE: Hiss yourself. While you're doing that, you might note that whereas Pinkard and
Harris disagree about whether Hegel intends "the Heart" or "Virtue" to refer to Don
Quixote, neither reference would be to modern German developments.
HE: Okay, but let me finish making this—^what did you say I couldn't make?—oh, yes, this
argument. Naturally, the "way of the world" eventually prevails over the "knight of virtue."
Harris believes, by the way, that "MachiaveUi is the thinker of the World's Way." This
results in an individualism that claims that there exists, within each person, an inner namre
which is itself neither influenced nor dependent upon the environment or the person's
actions. Pinkard believes that Hegel has two models for this sort of individualism. The
first is "most likely the seventeenth and eighteenth-century conception of the honnetehomme
(or, in England, the 'gendeman")." The second model, according to Pinkard, "for Hegel's
discussion would be Rousseau as he presents himself in his autobiography. Confessions, a
work that may be said to complete the development of that ideal of character that has to
do with sincetity."^^ It complicates this argument hardly at all that Harris claims that "we
are now in the world of Fichte's 'individuals.'"^'^
SHE: Well, that's not so bad, but it needs work. You'll conclude, I expect, that whereas
Forster believes that Hegelis solelyconcerned with modern German developments in these
sections of the Reason chapter, Pinkard recognkes that Hegel is also concerned with French
shapes of consciousness. In turn, this strongly suggests that Hegel does not depart from
his official project. The chapter on Spirit
«o/rewrite the sections in the Reason chapter,
and the Spirit chapter provides the social context of those sections.
HE: Yes, that's exacdy what I wanted to say.
SHE: Good. Now be quiet, the next talk is about to start.
HE: But....
SHE: Shhh.

ACT II: HEGEL'S NEPHEW, DIDEROT ^
Bin gejlickter Stmmpf pst] besser als ein ;(errissener; nicht so das

Moderator. Since the third paper, "Hegel's Sublime Sublation of
Diderot," won't be delivered, our next speaker has requested to take
advantage of the extra time thus made available.

Harris, Hegel's Ladder II, 55.
Pinkard, Hegefs Phenomenolog,113—14.
Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenohp, 114; compare Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau:
Transparency/ and Obstruction, Arthur Goldhammer, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1988), 261—66.
^ Harris, Hegel's Ladder11, IS.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Aphorismen aus KegelsWastebook (1803-1806),"Werke
2: Jenaer Scbriften, 1801-1807 (Prahkiatt amM-ski: Suhrkamp, 1996), 558; translation: "A
mended sock [is] better than a torn one; not so self-consciousness."

192

16J0-18J0
^ ACT II, SCENE 1 *

In the last paragraph of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel reveals what
readers may already have realized for themselves, that his text presents
"a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gaUery of images [Galerie von
Bildern\."^^ The progression of these images (Bilderti) exhibits spirit's
education and development (Bildun^. Each image exemplifies a
particular shape of consciousness. In addition to philosophical texts,
Hegel frequently turns to literature for his images. Among the literary
works he incorporates into the Phenomenology of Spirit are Tieck's Luind
of Upside Down, Sophocles^ Antigone, Shakespeare's Macbeth and Hamlet,
Schiller's Robbers, Novalis's Heniy von Ofterdingen, Jacobi's Woldemar,
Goethe's Wilhelm Meister isA Faust, and Diderot's Rameau'sNephew.
Scholars have tried to find the key for interpreting the
Phenomenology of Spirit'm one of its sections. The most famous attempt
is Kojeve's reading, according to which Hegel's discussion in the
"Lordship and Bondage" section unlocks his text.^^ Rather than
providing an interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit, however, such
approaches invariably reproduce the one-sided and distorted
perspective of a sublated shape of consciousness within that section.^®
In spite of this, the most profound tnistake is always almost the truth,
such that the truth is reached through error's inversion. It is precisely
because such error is so close to the tmth that it is seductive and
dangerous.
This is evidenced in the sarcasm and irony that Hegel displays in
the "Physiognomy and Phrenology" section of the Phenomenology of

Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §808, 492. For discussions, see: David W. Price, "Hegel's
Intertextual Dialectic: Diderot's he Neveu de Pameau in the Phenomenolo^ of Spiritf Clio 20:3
(Spring 1991): 223-33; John H. Smith, The Spirit and Its hetter. Traces ofPhetork in Hegel's
Philosoply ^Bildung (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Allen Speight, Hegel, Literature
and the Problem ofAgeng (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Donald Phillip
Verene, Hegel's Pecolkction: A Study of the Imagesin the Phenomenology of Spirit (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1985). Although the motion picture represented a
technological advance, Hegel had already cleared a space for it at the conceptual level.
"Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction tothe Reading ofHegei Lecture on the Phenomenelogy of Spirit,trans.
James H. Nichols,Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
Compare Richard A. Lynch, "Mutual Recogmtion and the Dialectic of Master and Slave;
Reading Hegel against Kojeve," International PhilosophicalQuarterly 41:1 (March 2001): 33-48;
and Patrick Riley, "Introduction to the Reading of Alexandre Kojeve," Political Theory 9:1
(February 1981): 5-48.
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Spirit. Believing that a person's character is determined by the shape of
the skull, phrenology implicidy asserts that "the beingofSpiritis a bone."^"^
He responds to phrenology with such hostility because it is almost his
own position. Spirit is always embodied, according to Hegel.
Phrenology's error, however, is to believe that spirit can be identified
with, and is nothing more than,its material embodiment. Analogously,
the belief that a part of the Phenomenologji of Spirit can unlock the whole
is so radically mistaken that it is almost correct. What is true, as will be
shown below, is that a part can exhibit the whole.
Within the picture gallery that is the Phenomenology of Spirit, Puimeau's
Nephew holds a privileged position. All of the other images exemplify
some particular shape of consciousness. Diderot's dialogue does that
too, through the character of the Nephew. However, Rameau'sNephew,
considered in its entirety, is also a mise en abyme of the Phenomenology of
Spirit. A mise en abjmexs, an internal duplication, an inescutcheon, where
a part of the whole mirrors or pictures the whole—as in Gide's
Counterfeiters, where Edouard is writing a novel called The Counterfeiters^^
The perspective and character of the Nephew is not such an internal
duplication. Rather, it is Diderot's dialogue, taken as a whole, that
serves this function. Because Rameau'sNephewis aninternal duplication
of the Phenomenology of Spirit, it is possible to use each text to interpret
the other. Hegel reads Diderot, who returns the complmient.
An ineliminatable problem confronts any interpretation of the
Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel expects his readers to recognize not only
the one-sided nature of the shapes of consciousness that populate his
text, but also the ways in which these shapes are related to each other.
He gives his readers help and guidance, but leaves some of the work
for them as well. As a consequence, although some interpretations can
be shown to misunderstand the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel's text is
structured so that no final distinction can be maintained between what
is already in the text and what readers bring to it. Westphal expresses
this point as follows:

" Hegel, fhenomenohg) of Spirit, §343, 208.
Andre Gide, The Counterfeiters: With Journal of'The Counterfeiters,"Dorothy Bussy and Justin
O'Brien, trans. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952).
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Because Hegel proceeds by showing, where we are supposed
to reap the philosophical benefits of those displays, even
though often we can only do so by being far more
sophisticated about those displays and the principles
displayed than the observed form of consciousness itself, the
line between what is strictly speaking to be found in his text
and what we may only be able to be read into or out of it
simply may not exist.''^

(As an aside, an awareness of this point would have helped the thesis
of the first paper, which argued that—because the relevant sections in
the Reason chapter refer to both German and French develop
ments—the Spirit chapter does not rewrite the sections in Reason, and
hence the
chapter provides the social context of those sections in
Reason)
The closest approximation to a definitive reading of the
Phenomenology of Spirit would be one that treated all previous
interpretations as Hegel treats the shapes of consciousness within the
Phenomenology of Spirit, realizing all the while that it too will eventually
have been sublated as a moment in some future reading.''^ Be that as
it may, the result of this interpretive situation is that the claim that
Rumeau's Nephew is a mise en abjme of the Phenomenology of Spirit can be
corroborated, finally, only by the interpretive fruits of that hypothesis.
We will proceed as follow. First, the parallelisms between
Ruimeau's Nephew and Phenomenology of
will be discussed. We will
demonstrate that these parallels exist in the stmcture of the texts as

Kenneth R.'^ss\^h3!L,Hegel'sEpistemologicalKealism: A Study ofthe Aim andMethod of Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit (DotdiSie.ch.t. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 139.
Compare James A. Ogilvy, "Reflections on the Absolute," The Rmeiu of Metaphysics 28:3
(March 1975): 525: "If absolute knowledge is interpreted as a final reckoning, as a last
judgment that separates heavenly truth from infernal error, then little wonder that the
interpretation that takes such absolute knowledge as its object sees itself 2.% (a) an interpretation
that is final, and (b) an interpretation that consigns all other interpretations to the flames
without so much as a backward glance at their 'necessity.' AH other readings of Hegel become
simply wrong. If, on the other hand, an interpretation of absolute knowledge finds within
absolute knowledgean imperadve tocomprehend allcontrary interpretations thathave in fact
arisen, then the ultimate model of definitive interpretation is quit different from the final
judgement. The task of the interpreter is then a reconciliation with the reality of differing
Hegel interpretations—a rational reconciliation to be sure."
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well as in their content. Second, we will argue that Rameau'sNepheir can
be usefully interpreted from the perspective of Hegel's text. Finally,
the interpretive spotlight wiU be turned around, and we wUl show that
the Phenomenology of Spirit can be read in light of Diderot's dialogue.

^ AcTll, SCENE 2, BEAT I ^
The narrative voices of Rameau's Nephew and the Phenomenology of Spirit
are isomorphic. Rameau's Nephew is a dialogue between two persons,
Nti (the Nephew of Rameau) and Moi (the narrator, never identified by
name, addressed by Uui as "master Philosopher"). However, the
dialogue itself is introduced by the narrator—^who, nota bene, is
reporting a dialogue that has already occurred. Although readers may
infer that the dialogue happened in the narrator's recent past, this is
never explicitly stated. The narrator informs the readers about what
happened during the dialogue by, for example, describing the Neph
ew's pantomimes. The narrator also retrospectively comments on the
dialogue. Since the narration of the dialogue occurs after the dialogue,
it is possible that at least some of the narrator's comments are insights
that result from his reflections on it. In addition to the narrative voices
of ljui, Moi, and the narrator, it is necessary to add the voice of the
readers who—shaving made their way through the dialogue of
and
Moi—recapimlate it in thought, perhaps arriving at insights not
(explicitly) articulated by the narrator.'^^
These narrative voices find their complements in the Phenomenology
of Spirit. First, there is the shape of consciousness that is being
observed, the natural consciousness. The natural consciousness
sojourns through the Phenomenology of Spirit,but without understanding
the experiences to which it is subjected. Second, the scientific or
phenomenological observer watches the natural consciousness'
dialectical transitions from one shape of consciousness to the next.
Third, there is the narrator who chronicles these dialectical transitions.
The narrator's voice is primarily heard in the "Preface" to the Phenomen-

Is there not still a distinct fifth narrative voice, that of Diderot as author? No. That voice
has been subsumed—always already, and without remainder—^In the voices of LKI, Moi, the
narrator, and the readers' moment of recapitulation.

196

16J0-18J0

okgj) of spirit, as well as in such later insertions as Infinity (paragraphs
168—73), Life (168—73), and Pure Recognition (178—85).'*^ In ^menu's
Nephew, the narrator frequently takes Mofs role, but also has insights
not available to L^fs interlocutor. Similarly, the Vhenomenolog) of Spirits
narrator frequently plays the role of the phenomenological observer; at
other times, the narrator steps out of the character of the
phenomenological observer to explain the significance of what has
been shown or to delineate what will be seen next. Finally, although
Hegel's readers occupy the position of the phenomenological observer
throughout, via the narrator's voice, they are capable of a
comprehension not (explicidy) stated by the narrator when—^in the
final chapter. Absolute Knowing—^those readers recollect the shapes of
consaousness."*^
^ ACT II, SCENE 2, BEAT II ^
In addition to an isomorphism between the voices within Kameau's
Nephew 2XA the Phenomenology ofSpirit, their argumentative structures also
correspond. The "motor" for each text is a process of dialectical
reversal, whereby a seemingly dominant position is forced to
acknowledge the superiority of what initially appears as a subordinate
position.'^® In Rameau'sNephew,Moi states a principle that he accepts and
claims everyone else accepts as well. LMi responds by noting that there
are legitimate exceptions to this principle, exceptions whose existence
Moi accepts, however grudgingly. Having established that there are
exceptions to Mo/s principle, hui then argues that everyone else follows

" Eric Dickson is thanked for recognizing these.
What about Hegel's voice as author? As in the case of Diderot's authorial voice, it has been
•whoUy sublated into those voices of the natural consciousness, the phenomenological
observer, the narrator, and the readers' recoUective moment.
Compare Walter E. Rex, Diderot'sCounterpoints: The Dynamics ofContrariety in HisMa/orWorks
(Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1998), 262-63: "The fundamental pattern, the basic process
which will be repeated in increasing elaborate forms throughout the dialogue, is masterfully
complete. Hegel might with good reason be appealed to as authorisation for seeing this
particular passage as a dialectical movement: although originally voicing the sentiments of all
right-thinking people, somehow Moi, with his angry, unnatural principles, now reduced to
threats of violence, has come to seem like the odd man out, the perverse one, refusing to
behave like everyone else, while the Nephew, backed by the conduct of all society, including,
he subtly hints, the Court, rides the ride of enjoyment, of doing things everyone naturally
wants to do. The exception has ended as the rule."
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the exception, and that Moi is the only one who follows the principle.
By means of this dialectical reversal, what Moi had tendered as a
principle turns out to be the rarely followed exception, and what Lui
had offered as the exception proves to be the principle. Not content
with this victory, Uui frequently takes the last step of obliging Moi to
concede that he, like everyone else, does not always follow his
principle. This pattern is schematized by Rex as follows:
(A) provocation (by either or both parties);
(B) the original contrariety (Moi invariably speaks for rightthinkers; Lui for impulses and behaviour right-thinkers
would never condone);
(C) the reversal (Lui becomes everybody; Moi barely
anybody);
(D) ultimate irony: actually Moi is more implicated in Lui's
behaviour than he admits.'^^
A perspicuous example of this pattern occurs when hui
immediately recognizes that Mo/s condemnation of Uu?s "vile litde
tricks" presupposes a universal morality that all right-thinking persons
foUow. hui first compares this universal morality to the universal
grammar that everyone speaks. He next notes that there are many
exceptions to the universal grammar—and Moi is only too happy to
add that such exceptions are called "idioms," thereby making himself
complicit in the impending dialectical reversal, ljui then states that, just
as there are idioms that are exceptions to the universal grammar, so
each profession possesses its own "trade idioms," or "moral idioms"
which are exceptions to Moi% universal morality. Having established
this much, Ijti has no difficulty in forcing Moi to concede that, since
practically everyone belongs to at least one profession, almost everyone
follows moral idioms. The moral idioms are actually universal, and the
purported universal morality itself is no more than another idiom,
rarely foUowed.'^^
The twist of the knife in this dialectical reversal would be for Moi
to confess that he also practices moral idioms. While not stated byl-ui.

' Rex, Diderot's Counterpoints, 263.
' Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," 31-33.

198

16J0-18J0

Moi, or the narrator, the readers' narrative voice provides the final twist.
Earlier in the dialogue, Moi had objected to Lui's current practice of
hiring himself out to teach students about matters of which he is
ignorant. Lui remembers that there was a time when Moi was not so
well off. Then, as Lui recalls, Moi wore "a shaggy gray coat.. .worn
through on one side," with his "cuffs ragged," and with "black woolen
stockings mended up the seam with white thread.'"^' Moi has to
concede that he gave lessons in mathematics when he knew nothing
about it. The circle is now complete. Far from Mofs universal morality
being truly universal, it is revealed as a moral idiom followed only by
those with sufficient wealth to not need other moral idioms. Indeed,
rather than at least having the status of a trade
universal morality
has sunk to the level of a hobby or diversion.^"
This pattern of dialectical reversal finds its complement in Hegel's
text. It has become common in the secondary literature on Lameau's
Nephew to claim that its argumentative stmcture is incompatible with
that of the Phenomenology of Spiritheczust Diderot's text does not waltz
Hegel's three-steps of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. This objection not
only fails to note that Hegel never uses these terms, it also ignores his
explicit claims regarding the futility of counting the number of
moments in the dialectic;
In so far as the otherness falls into two parts. Spirit might, as
regards its moments—^if these are to be counted—be more
exactly expressed as a quaternity in unity or, because the
quantity itself again falls into two parts, viz. one part which
has remained good and the other which has become evil,
might even be expressed as a five-in-one. But to count the
moments can be reckoned as altogether useless, since in the
first place what is differentiated is itself just as much one

Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," 26.
Moreover, through an inversion of Socratic wisdom, Lui argues that his teaching
composition and thoroughbass,about which he admits his ignorance,is better for his students
than that of teachers who claim to know those subjects; see Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew,"
26; "That's why others were worse than I, namely those who thought they knew something.
I at least never spoiled the minds or the hands of children. When they went from me to a
good master, having leant nothing they had nothing to unlearn, which was time and money
saved."
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thing—viz. the thought of the difference which is only one
thought—as it [the differentiated] is this differentiated
element, the second relatively to the first. And, secondly, it
is useless to count because the thought which grasps the
Many in a One must be dissolved out of its universality and
differentiated into more than three or four distinct
components; and this universality appears, in contrast to the
absolute determinateness of the abstract unit, the principle of
number, as indeterminateness with respect to number as
such, so that we could speak only of numbers in general, i.e.
not of a specific number of differences. Here, therefore, it is
quite superfluous to think of numbers and counting at all,
just as in other respects the mere difference of quantity and
amount has no conceptual significance and makes no
difference.^^
Hegel calls the dialectical road that Spirit must walk "the way of
despair."^^ Readers frequently find this an apt description of their own
experience while reading the Vhenomenohg) of Spirit. They are mollified
when the semblance of truth is presented first, along with a promise of
the full truth to follow.
Although Hegel's dialectic is not a thesis-antithesis-synthesis waltz,
it may be presented that way as an approximation of the truth.The

Hegel, Fhemmenologs of Spirit.,§776,469; translation modified. See Georg W. F. Kegel, J
ofLiogic, A. V. Miller, trans. (New York Humanities Press, 1969), 836, where this point is
articulated even more clearly. "In this turning point of the method, the course of cognition
at the same time returns to itself. As self-sublating contradiction this negativity is the
restoration of the first immediacy, of simple universality; for the other of the other, the negative
of the negative, is immediately the positive, the identical, the universal. If one insists on counting,
this second immediate is, in the course of the method as a whole, the third term to the first
immediate and the mediated. It is also, however, the third term to the first or formal negative
and to absolute negativity or the second negative; now as the first negative is already the
second term, the term reckoned as third can also be reckoned as fourth, and instead of a
triplicity, the abstract form may also be taken as a quadruplicity-, in this way, the negative or the
difference is counted as a duality. The third or fourth is in general the unity of the first or
second moments, of the immediate and the mediated. That it is this unity, as also that the
whole form of the method is triplicity, is, it is true, merely the superficial external side of the
mode of cognition."
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spnrit, §78,49.
^ This is obviously Hegel-for-Dummies; compare Gustav E. Mueller, "The Hegel Legend of
"Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis,"' The Journal of the Histoty of Ideas 19 (1958): 411—14.
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thesis is a partial and one-sided truth which asserts that it is the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The antithesis claims that
the thesis is false. The antithesis's merit consists in its seeing that the
thesis is not true, but its limitation is that it fails to recognize that the
thesis is not entirely false. The conflict between the thesis and
antithesis results in a synthesis. The synthesis agrees with the antithesis
that the thesis is false, but it also perceives and preserves the element
of truth within the false. This synthesis becomes a new thesis, which
is then confronted with its own antithesis, leading to yet a new
synthesis.^'* The dance continues until Hegel's Big Band plays the final
tune. Absolute Knowing, and a thesis emerges that is the complete truth.
That was tmth's approximation. So, what needs to be added to
reach the truth about Hegel's dialectic? Three things, naturally. First,
the truth that emerges in Absolute Knowing is spirit's recognition, and
recollection, of the path that it has traveled. This truth is not the end
of spirit's sojourn, however, but its comprehension. Spirit will always
continue, but it now recognizes itself in and as its journey
Second, the moments in Hegel's dialectic are necessary, but this
necessity is entirely retrospective. From the point at which spirit has
arrived, every step along its journey was necessary—^but only because,
had any step been different, spirit would have arrived somewhere else.^*^
Finally, the thesis is not the first step. Rather, the thesis is the
second step, the retroactive consequence of the antithesis. Put
otherwise, the thesis becomes determinate only as a result of the

Compare Mitchell H. Miller Jr., "The Attainment of the Absolute Standpoint in Hegel's
Phenomenolo^" in Jon Stewart, ed.. The Phemmenolo^ of Spirit Reader Critical and Intetpretive
Essays (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), 428: "In the Hegelianversion of phenomenology.. .each
finite standpoint of consciousness involves a conception of reality which, as its own
experience shows, is one-sided. And this means that consciousness, to preserve the 'side'
which itasserts, must also accept the 'side'which it unknowingly at first excludes. But, by this
acceptance of both sides at once, consciousness transcends its earlier shape, knowing now a
whole where before it was the knowing of only a part."
Compare Walter D. Ludwig, "Hegel's Conception of Absolute Knowing," OW of Minerva
21:1 (1989): 5-19; and "The Method of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spiritf Owl of Minerva 23:2
(1992): 165-75.
^ Compare Leon J. Goldstein, "Dialectic and Necessity in Hegel's Philosophy of History,"
in Leon Pompa and William H. Dray, editors. Substance and Form in Histo^: A Collection of
Essays in Philosophy of Histoiy (Edinburgh: Edinburgjh University Press, 1981), 42-57; and
"Force and the Inverted World in Dialectical Retrospection," International Studies in Phihsophj
20:3 (1988): 13-28.
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antithesis. This point can be seen by turning to musical composition."
Although it may seem counterintuitive, eight-tone composition emerg
es aseight-tone composition only with the introduction of twelve-tone
composition. Prior to twelve-tone composition, musicians did not
compose using the eight-tone scale; they just composed. Only with the
invention of twelve-tone composition is it possible to compose using
the eight-tone scale, and to realize that previous musicians composed
that way as well.^® The same phenomenon occurs with acting. Only
after the Stanislavski Method is it possible to practice presentation
acting, and to recognize that earlier thespians acted that way too.
Since the thesis becomes the thesis only when its antithesis arises
to oppose it, the dialectic does not go thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but
rather (antithesis)-thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Learning to count with
Hegel: Not 1, 2, 3; but first 2, and then 1, 2, 3." No wonder that he
first warns that "to count the moments can be reckoned as altogether
useless," and then adds that "it is quite superfluous to think of
numbers and counting at all."®^ Hegel's dialectic is a waltz, after all—a
three-step dance in four-beat time. Perhaps it is unnecessary to note
that this exactly matches the schematization Rex discerns in ^mean's
Nephew.

^ ACT II, SCENE 2, BEAT III ^
We have shown that the narrative voices within ^mean's Nephew and
the Phenomenology of Spirit are isomorphic and that their argumentative
strncmres correspond. In addition, both texts exhibit and embody
divided consciousnesses.

In addition, turning to composition also exhibits that tiameau's Nephew is the retroactive
consequence of its incorporation within the Phemmenologi of Spirit.
Even prior to the advent of twelve-tone composition, a similar event occurred when JeanPhilippe Rameau, the Nephew's uncle, introduced the main concept of his music theory, the
thoroughbass.
Is not this moment of determinate negation repeated in the generation of zero? In counting
pennies, for example, the first coin is not counted as 0 but as 1. To get 0, 1 must be
subtracted from a 1 that is at least posited if not actual. Counting, too, proceeds dialecticaUy:
Not 0,1, 2, 3; but first 1, next 1—1=0, then 1,2,3.
Hegel, Phenomemlog/ ofSpririt,§776,469. Compare Slavoj 2izek, "Why Should a Dialectician
Learn to Count to Four?," RadicalPhihsopbi 58 (1991): 3—9.
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In Ramau's Nephew, consciousness is divided between Moi and
l^ui-—that is too obvious to mention—^but each also has a divided
consciousness. The presence of a divided consciousness within L,ui is
clearest. The Nephew maintains that he despises genius because of its
undermining effect on the nation, friendship, and family harmony.
However, he also wishes to be a genius, and he sees all other things and
persons as tools to be manipulated in order to obtain what he wants.
He claims that there is nothing he wiU not do—^indeed, he glories in his
ability for self-debasement—^yet he asserts that his dignity will not allow
hkn to apologize for an insult and so regain admittance to the house
from which he was recently expelled. Lai rejects the notion of being
a type, and yet what he does best is imitate others; if he has any genius,
it is a genius for impersonations. He loves his departed wife, but had
planned to make her a prostitute. Moi also has a divided consciousness,
although that is less apparent. On the one hand, the Philosopher is
contempmous of the Nephew and thinks him an immoral reprobate.
On the other hand, Moi finds
fascinating. Finally, the Philosopher
suggests new shenanigans to the Nephew. Neither Moz nor hui can win
the argument. While each succeeds in getting the other to participate
in the construction of his own position, both are unable to convince
the other to remain there. Although it would be an exaggeration to say
that their dialogue ends on a note of mutual acceptance and
reconciliation, perhaps it contains a moment of acquiescence and
resignation wherein each recognizes the other's contribution.
Consciousness is also divided in the Phenomenolog)/ of Spirit.
Each of spirit's shapes is internally torn by tensions and
contradictions that it is incapable of resolving. Attempting to
overcome this diremption, a shape is transmuted into its successor.
This process continues until the "beautiful soul"—^which condemns
the deeds of others while refusing to do anything in a world that
it perceives as incorrigibly wicked—^becomes thoroughly "disordered
to the point of madness, wastes itself in yearning and pines away in
consumption."^^ Once that false position has gone under, the
moralizing and practical consciousnesses can cease their mutual
recriminations, recognize their dependence on one another, and
overcome their estrangement:

' Hegel, Phenomenohgf of Spirit, §668, 407.
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The true, i.e. the self-conscious and existent, equalization of the
two sides is necessitated by and already contained in the
foregoing. The breaking of the hard heart, and the raising of
it to universality, is the same movement which was expressed
in the consciousness that made confession of itself. The
wounds of the Spirit heal, and leave no scars behind. The
deed is not imperishable; it is taken back by Spirit into itself,
and the aspect of individuality present in it, whether as
intention or as an existent negativity and limitation,
straightway vanishes.'^^
In other words, spirit forgives itself...

* ACT II, SCENE 2, BEAT IV ^
In the secondary literature that discusses the embedding of Ra/neau's
Nepbew in the Phenomenology of Spirit,it is a commonplace to assert that
Hegel turns Diderot's polyphonic dialogue into a monophonic
dialectic. For instance,Jauss asks "whether the dialectical solution with
which the unreconciled standpoints of moi and lui are provided in the
Phanomenologie^2& able to maintain the personal development and open
dialogical relationship which characterized the moi and lui in Diderot's
dialogue, or whether it had to make them one-sided.'"'^ While he
clearly inclines toward his second option, Jauss finally leaves his

^ Hegel, Fhenomenologj! of Spirit,§669,407. This moment of reconciliation is reHected near the
conclusion of the chapter on V^U^rr. "The concept of Spirit which emerged for us as we
entered the sphere of religion, viz. as the movement of self-certain Spirit which forgives evil
and in so doing abandons its own simple unitary nature and rigid unchangeableness; or as the
movement in which what is in an absolute antithesis recognizes itself as the same as its
opposite, this recognition bursting forth as the affirmaHve between these extremes—this
concept is intuitively apprehendedhj the religious consciousness to which the absolute Being is
revealed, and which overcomes the difference between its Self and what it intuitively
apprehends; just as it is Subject, so also it is substance, and hence it is itself Spirit just because
and in so far as it is this movement" (§786,477; translation modified).
''Jauss, "The Dialogical and the Dialectical Neveu De Rameauf 20.
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question unanswered. Responding toJ auss, Gumbrecht shows no such
reticence, asserting that "dialectics turn the principle of consensus
(which has been characteristic of Enlightenment philosophy) into a
device of authoritarian discourse."^'^
As is frequently the case, what is required here is an inversion:
The incorporation of Rameau's Nephew into the Phenomenology of Spirit
does not reduce the former text to a monologue, but rather shows the
dialogical quality of the latter. Indeed, what Bakhtin says about
Dostoevsky is also tme of Hegel:
A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a
genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is infact the chief characteristic of
Dostoevsky's novels. What unfolds in his works is not a
multimde of characters and fates in a single objective world,
illuminated by a single authorial consciousness; rather a
plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own
world, combined but not merged in the unity of the event.
Dostoevsky's major heroes are, by the very nature of his
creative design, not only objects ofauthorial discourse but also subjects
of their own directly signifying discourse.
Kristeva's interpretation of Hegel's discussion represents a significant
advance beyond such critics as Jauss and Gumbrecht. "One is struck,
she writes, "by Hegel's faithfulness to that cynical polyphony of culture
as embodied by the Nephew.'"^*^ Recognizing that, for Hegel, the
Nephew "becomes the 'greatest truth' on the very account of the
'shamelessness manifested in stating this deceit,"' Kristeva nevertheless
believes that "this strangeness of culture, even though it be highly
appreciated, remains yet with Hegel a 'perversion' that, as scintillation
of the spirit and all the more so of witticism, must be transcended. The

Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, "Dialectics, or Authoritarian Monologue in Dialogue Disguise,"
Protocol of the Colloquy of the Centerfor Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modem Cultures: 27
Febmaty 1983, volume 45, (Berkeley; The Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and
Modern Cultures), 34.
Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics, Caryl Emerson, trans. (Minneapolis: Univer
sity of Minnesota Press, 1894), 6—7.
Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, Leon S. Roudiez, trans. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1991), 145.

Diderot's Uncle

205

polyphony of Hegel, a careful reader of Diderot, gives way before the
triadism of his dialectic."^^
Kristeva's readingis in many ways exemplary. Unlike other critics,
she sees that the Phenomenolo^ of Spirit is polyphonic. It only remains
so, she claims, as long as it tarries with the Nephew. The problem,
according to her, is that Hegel's text does not stay there:
The world of Culture will be surpassed by that of Morality
before finally turning into that of Religion and absolute
Spirit, for only the latter will be able to replace the simple
"presentations" of culture's perverse language with
thoughts Indeed, Culture in Hegel's sense, in its scission
and essential strangeness, proceeds by way of disunion and
contradiction, which it unifies in its wrenching discourse; but
the latter merely judges "by reducing everything to the self in
its aridity" and cannot grasp the substantial content of
thought.^®
The problem is not that Hegel faUs to tarry with the Nephew, pace
Kristeva, but rather that history does not do so. In the chapter on Spirit,
as Forster perceives, Hegel presents the social contexts of the
individual shapes of consciousness discussed in the Consciousness
through 'Reason chapters. The social context that the Nephew
exemplifies is inherently unstable, and it undermines itself. If Hegel
does not stay with the Nephew, this is only because the social context,
which the Nephew epitomizes, does not stay with itself.
Hegel does not argue against a shape of consciousness by
assuming premises that it would reject. He does not appeal to
intuitions or invoke theoretical prejudices. Instead, his critique
proceeds from a position that remains wholly internal to the shape
under investigation, thereby demonstrating that the shape fails
according to its own criteria for success. When one shape of
consciousness proves inadequate and so transforms into a successor
shape, this is because its position was inherendy unstable and could not
be maintained.

' Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, 146.
' Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, 146.
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^ AcTlI, SCENE 2, BEAT V *
Diderot and Hegel both wrote encyclopedias.

¥ ACTII,SCENES ^
Since ^mean's Nephew is a mise en alyme of the Phenomenology of Spirit,
then, each text illuminates the other. The next two moments of this
paper are thus spent reading Diderot with Hegel, and Hegel with
Diderot. Let us now examine the narrative stmcture of Diderot's
dialogue in closer detail, as this wiU ultimately provide insights into
reading, or re-reading the Phenomenology. As could be expected,
inversion gives these insights their own shape, with its multiple
implications and applications.

* ACT II, SCENE 3, BEAT I ^
The moment Hegel opened avenues for reading Puimeau's Nephew by
incorporating it into the Phenomenology of Spirit, subsequent readings of
Diderot's text became inevitably biased by anachronism. Indeed, the
anecdotal twist provided by Hegel's coming across its translation into
German by Goethe in the editorial saga surrounding the (his)story of
its publishing, makes Diderot an unwitting follower of Hegel, it makes
him an integral if anachronistically paradoxical, or paradoxically
anachronistic, part of Hegel's posterity. Put another way, Rameau's
Nphew turns into a branch off of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, the
genealogical roots of Diderot's text thus shaken by a subversive
revisiting of the traditionally linear direction of familial semiotics.
Appropriately enough, this accords with Diderot's own position in
regard to tradition and posterity. His well-documented difficulties as
the chief editor of the Pingclopedie, as well as his personal conflicts with
state censorship, fostered his sense that the significance of his
enterprise could not be fathomed by the vast majority of his
contemporaries, and that recognition of its valor would only come
from distant generations.
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As the character of the Nephew, envious of the long lasting
reputation of his uncle, echoes but also distorts this position, so does
the etymology of the familial relationship by which he is remembered.
The recent limitation of the meaning of "neveu" to "a brother's or
sister's son; also, by extension, the son of a brother- or sister-in-law"
obliterates its Latin extension "grandson," as well as "descendant,"
"neveux" (plural) being synonymous with posterity in early modem
Europe.® In yet another etymological twist, the Nephew becomes a
doubly ideal grafting point for a meeting of Hegel and Diderot. On the
one hand, the etymology of the word "nephew" also applies to the
natural world, meaning second offshoot; and on the other hand, as the
meaning of the Nephew's family name, "Rameau," itself designates a
secondary offshoot—or the literal ramification—of a branch. This
makes Rameau's Nephew a secondary offshoot to the second power!
Calling Diderot "Hegel's Nephew," then, is not so much a stretch of
the imagination, or even a mot d'esprit, as it becomes a by-product of the
editorial history of ^mean's Nephew, and of its concomitant and
subsequent developments in literary history, the history of ideas, and
philosophy.
If we now take a second look at how Rameau's Nephew and the
Phenomenolog)/ of Spirit first came into contact in the early 1800s, Goethe
and Hegel set the precedent for inversion to inform the reception of
both works. As the previous speaker noted, Goethe's translation of
Diderot's book is its first public appearance, while Hegel is among its
reading public. In this instance, France is the social context—and
France informs the development—of Germany. In addition, the
discovery in France in the early twentieth cenmry of Diderot's original
manuscript reaffirms the previous speaker's claims regarding the struc
ture of the Phenomenology of Spirit. It reaffirms both that the emergence
of the Nephew in the Spirit chapter does not constimte a deviation
from the original design of Hegel's work, and that it provides France
as the appropriate social context for Germany. The inversion arises
because Diderot's Rameau's Nephew will always already have seen the
light of day as its own offshoot—Goethe's Rameaus Neffe. In other
"Compare Oxford 'English DicHonaiy, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), "nephew." See
also Alain Rey, et alii, DicHonnaire historiqus de la languepanfoise, Paris; Dictionnaires Le Robert,
1992-98, 3 tomes, 2369-70; Emile Littre, Dictionnaire de la langue franfaise, Paris, Hachette,
1863.
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words, the offshoot is simultaneously its own root—the souche—^which
in tum converges with Rameau's witty metaphorical view of family
ramifications: "The old line branches out into a huge spread {somh^ of
fools [jo/j]."™
As Schmidt notes, the "sense that the modern age was
distinguished by alienation and division pervaded Hegel's writings
throughout the Jena period."^^ This makes the Nephew—defined by
the fact that "he has no greater opposite than himself \rien ne dissemble
plus de lui que lui-meme\"''^—^an epitome of the spirit of that age. "Even
before work had begun on the Phenomenologj/" Schmidt adds, "Hegel
had come to see Bildung as a process marked by division and
dismemberment, creating a world that was defined by its selfestrangement."^^ Hegel's view is expressed in the
chapter, which,
according to Schmidt, "eschews the conventional image of Bildungzs an
organic unfolding of a form immanent in an individual or a people and
instead presents Bildung as a process of relendess self-estrangement."^'*
As Hegel writes, spirit is a part of a world, "a world that is double,
divided and self-opposed," where "nothing has a Spirit thatis grounded
within itself and indwells in it, but each has its being in something
outside of and alien to it."^^ Spirit now arises from the process of selfestrangement, the process by which Spirit becomes itself.
Rameau's above-mentioned view of family history also illustrates
this process as a movement from one being into another, in which each
new offshoot {sot) emerges from the common root {souche). Selfestrangement fmds yet another apt instantiation in the opening pages
of Bameau's NepheiP—^in the quoted passage with which the previous
paper concluded—^where the narrator compares the Nephew to a grain
of yeast. After acknowledging that, despite his dislike of "such
eccentrics," once a year, the narrator will stop and listen to them:
If such a character makes his appearance in some circle, he
is like a grain of yeast that ferments and restores to each of

Diderot, Rameau's Nepheif, 79.
" Schmidt, "The Fool's Truth," 631.
Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," 9.
Schmidt, "The Fool's Truth," 631-32.
Schmidt, "The Fool's Truth," 631.
Hegel, Rhenomenologf of Spirit, §486, 295.
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us a part of his native individuality. He shakes and stirs us
up, makes us praise or blame, smokes out the truth, discloses
the worthy and unmasks the rascals. It is then that the
sensible man keeps his ears open and sorts out his
company.^^
The Philosopher's comparison illustrates and illuminates what Schmidt
identifies as the conventional understanding of Bildung. The "organic
unfolding of a form immanent in an individual" mirrors the "native
individuality' restored to each under the external yet organic agency of
yeast. In other words, Moi not only concedes that he enjoys an annual
kick from the Nephew's unconventional and unorthodox eccentricity.
In the same breath, he also admits that he receives an external kick
from the Nephew—a kick that stirs him up, and ferments the truth out
of "the sensible man." Put yet another way, Moi describes the
movement that Spirit undergoes when rising from the state of plain
consciousness to that of self-estrangement, and then is sublated into
reflexive consciousness.^^

^ ACT II, SCENE 3, BEAT II ^
The intervention of an external kick that sets self-estrangement into
motion in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spiritimds its expression in Rameau's
Nephewin the interaction between the Philosopher and the Nephew, set
against the backcloth of a social milieu in which each individual is selfestranged and all are estranged from one another. The discussion
between Moi and l^ui concerning social intercourse as a beggar's
pantomime—also referred to by the Nephew as the taking of positions
in a dancing metaphor for the underpinnings of social interac-

Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," 10.
" Diderot's image of the two-headed monster in the Additions pour servir d'eclairtissements d
• endroits de la Ijettre sur les sourds et muets, provides another version of the twisted
offshoot imagery,which illustrates Diderot's attempt at grasping the development of thought
processes by imagining that one head could be thinking while the other would be observing
it thinking. The second head figures an offshoot of the first, estranged yet still attached to the
original root of the spirit at work. See Denis Diderot, CEums: Esthetique-Thedtn, vol IV,
(Paris: Laffont, 1996), 51-75

210

16J0-18J0

tion™—^provides an exemplary instance of Hegel's Bildung as selfestrangement and of Diderot's characterization of the Nephew as a
yeast-like self-estranging agent, especially wherein l^i points out
contradictions between Mw's philosophical or moral stances and his
physical wrraw-stances. In addition, the dynamics inherent in positiontaking simultaneously coalesces and articulates three dual oppositions
common to the Enlightenment of Diderot and Hegel; the opposition
between the private and the public, the opposition between essence
and existence or appearance, and the opposition between the self and
the estranged self.
These three sets of oppositions find their expression in the two
discussions of Diogenes—^the founder of the ancient school of
Cynicism, as well as a central figure for the Enlightenment^'—that
frame the dialogue between Moi and IML In each instance, they discuss
the taking of positions. The first reference to Diogenes occurs at the
opening of the dialogue. As Moi and Ijui joke that a beard is the only
prop needed to make the Nephew into a philosopher, Rameau invokes
Diogenes as his model, based as much on Diogenes' outrageous speech
and behavior as on his notorious interactions with prostitutes. The
second reference, at the end of the dialogue, springs from MoJs claim
that the only human beings exempt from taking positions in the
pantomime are not kings, as the Nephew argues—Abound as kings are
to bow before their mistresses or their gods—but philosophers. Moi
explicitly bases his claim on the model of Diogenes. From inside his
tub, the Cynic was able to remain at a 'di-stance' from the morally
duplicitous, reprehensible, and self-alienating pantomime his fellow
citizens sheepishly or slavishly followed. Or so Moi asserts. As we wiU
see shortly, Hegel knows better.

Ballet choreographer Noverre—^known throughout Enlightenment Europe for his
innovative creations, some of which were inspired by the dramatic reform launched by
Diderot with the advent of bourgeois drama in the 1750s—^is referred to by the Nephew as
the one to ask in order to get the proper definition for social pantomime. The mime, and by
extension, the artist, becomes the ultimate authorityon the underpinnings of social interaction
as, one might claim, on those of self-development.
™ For a treatment of the reception of the Cynics from the Antiquity on, see R. Bracht
Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Caze, eds.. The Cynics, The Cynic Movement in Antiqui^ and
lis Legay (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). Heinrich Niehues-Probsting
contributes the article on "The Modern Reception of Cynicism: Diogenes in the Enlighten
ment," 329-65.

Diderot's Uncle

211

Scholars often believe that the way in which the second discussion
of Diogenes ends indicates that Moi gets the upper hand, as he
consistendy rebuts the Nephew's attempts to show that even Diogenes
took positions. However, the narrative progression of the dialogue
seems to suggest that the Nephew gets the upper hand. Although the
discussion between the Philosopher and the Nephew actually results in
a tie, as we demonstrate below, still it is useful to spend more than a
few moments—to tarry, as Hegel would say—examining why even an
attentive reader might believe that the Nephew does get the upper
hand.

% ACT II, SCENE 3, BEAT III ^
How so? Recall that the Nephew, not the Philosopher, makes the
initial reference to Diogenes. As a resrJt, the Nephew's interpretation,
however partial, and perhaps aU the more since it is partial, colors and
contaminates the rest of the discussion between the two characters.
Thus, this makes the Philosopher's own eventual reference to Diogenes
an implicit reaction to the Nephew's earlier statement, rather than a
position taken spontaneously and independently from an outside
influence—an external kick, as it were. In this instance, it is the
Nephew, not the Philosopher, who follows the cynics' technique of
"provocation, particularly in the form of 'shamelessness,' which
Diogenes used not as an end in itself, but as a pedagogical instrument
intended... to shock his interlocutors out of their complacency."®"
We see an instance of the Nephew's use of the cynical technique
of provocation when, shortly after first mentioning Diogenes, he
laments the loss of his sinecure as a fool in the Bertin household. In

See R. Btacht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Caze'sintroduction toThe Cynics, The Cyme
Movement inAntiquiy and Its Legay (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 27. The
Philosopher's references to Diogenes need to be interpreted within the context of the history
of philosophy. Thequestion whether cynicismis a philosophy or a way of life is controversial.
On the one hand Diogenes' cynicism appears to be essentially pragmatic, based on a rebuttal
of philosophical systems as such—a position not unlike the Enlightenment's own rebuttal of
"esprit de systteie." On the other hand, Diogenes' immediate followers turn cynicism into
a philosophy, one that directly competes with other philosophies. As a result, Mois efforts
to sermonize the Nephew back into more moral ways by appealing to Diogenes are thus
doomed to fail.
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response, the Philosopher suggests that the Nephew should return,
throw himself on the ground, beg forgiveness from Berlin's mistress,
and so win his way back into that "menagerie." As the Nephew then
points out, complying with the Philosopher's advice would require that
he forgo his human dignity and figuratively kiss her ass. The
Philosopher does not maintain that individuals must never trample on
their own human dignity, as one would expect firom "the sensible
man." Instead, he suggests that the Nephew should literal^ kiss her
arse. Moreover, the Philosopher does not lack for words in describing
the mistress' physical attractiveness; "But see here, she's pretty, kind,
plump, and white-skinned." This apparently rhetorical twist on the
Nephew's professed position-taking backfires on the Philosopher, as
Moi further hints that someone as virtuous as he would not refuse this
"act of humility that even a prouder man than you could condescend
to."®' Here we see the consequences of the Nephew's technique of
provocation in action: On the one hand, the Philosopher explicitly
advise him to violate the moral principles that the Philosopher
professes; on the other hand, the Philosopher further undermines his
moral authority when he su^ests that he too would be prepared to
violate these principles.
In our earlier discussion of the correspondence between the
argumentative structures within 'Rameau'sNephewmd. the Vhenomenolog^
of Spirit, we already saw a contradiction between the Philosopher's
proclaimed role as a moral authority and his advocacy of morally
reprehensible behavior. This occurred when as a young man, needing
money, he taught mathematics, knew nothing about it, but pretended
he did. Then, he not only needed money, he wanted it to afford the
services of prostimtes.®^ Even now, the Philosopher admits to
occasionally casting a lustful eye on a pretty face, thereby openly
displaying a propensity for the same sensual inclinations that he
condemns in the Nephew:
I am far firom despising sensual pleasures. I have a palate too
and it is tickled
by a delicate wine or dish; I have eyes
and a heart and I Uke to look at a pretty woman, like to feel

Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," 21.
Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," 26.
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the curve of her breast under my hand, press her lips to
mine, drink bliss from her eyes and die of ecstasy in her arms.
Sometimes a gay party with my friends, even if it becomes a
little rowdy, is not displeasing to me.®^
If the Philosopher could acknowledge that he was no exception to the
universal pantomime going on in society, his point would be much
stronger, although this would blur considerably the differences between
him and the Nephew, Thus, the Philosopher's claimed allegiance to
Diogenes on an intellectual plane loses validity.
His previously discussed admissions show two things. First,
although he claims to follow universal morality, his practice of moral
idioms shows that he also takes positions. Unlike Diogenes, the
Philosopher is incapable of rejecting his own mores to embrace
Diogenes' morals. Second, his very attempt to imitate Diogenes is the
taking of a position. As a result, the claim that Diogenes could serve
as a moral ideal is not compromised, it is undermined. In contrast to
the Philosopher's professed loyalty to Diogenes because of his putative
independence from all position-taking, it is Diogenes' lust for women
that motivates the Nephew's own professed loyalty to him. Noting
that "the philosopher-myself entertains with Diogenes the same
oblique relationshipJean-Francois Rameau does with his avaricious and
too famous uncle," Starobinski writes that "the philosopher-myself is
Diogenes' nephew."®'^ This insightful remark needs to be pushed one
step further. If the Philosopher is to Diogenes as the Nephew is to
Rameau the Uncle, then the Philosopher not only becomes a
"pantomime," but also a follower of the Nephew—^in other words, the
Nephew's Nephew.

Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," 36. In this passage, the passive form of "flatter"
from the verh "to flatter," translated as "tickled") introduces the philosopher's taste for
sensory and sensual pleasures—barely masked by understatement and euphemism in "Je ne
meprise pas ksplaisirs des sens" and "me partie de debauche. ..neme deplattpat' ("a gay party.. .is not
displeasing to me" and "I am far from despising sensual pleasures'^, thus betraying a kind of
practical return of the repressed—the repressed in principle, that is.
Jean Starobinski,"Diogene dans ]>Seveu de Yuimsau" Stanford French Rm'ew(Fall 1994):151.
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^ ACT II, SCENE 3, BEAT IV

In the previous section, we discussed why readers might mistakenly
believe that the Nephew wins his debate with the Philosopher about
Diogenes. Nevertheless, their debate actually ends in a tie. The stated
principles of the Nephew and the Philosopher—^unbridled sensual
desire and excessive moral virtue, respectively—fail to coincide with
their actions. The Philosopher is only partially Diogenic in his words
and behavior. Similarly, the Nephew displays only partial fidelity to
Diogenes when he dismisses the Cynic's morals and virtue, turning
them into vice in putting forth the arbitrariness of moral values. This
is recognized by Starobinski when he writes that "neither of the
interlocutors in Rameau's Nephew is in fuU agreement with Diogenes:
virtuous fmgality fits neither the parasite-musician nor the philosophermyself."®^ He argues for this narratologicaUy, examining the
symmetrically opposite discussions of Diogenes in Rameau's Ne
phew—that is, at the beginning and the end of the dialogue. As a result of
this structural mirroring, Diogenes becomes the narratological and
thematic eqtoivalent of a focal point at the invisible center of a painting
(the dialogue) and identifiable only ficom the outskirts of its frame by
the beholder (the reader).®®
This embedding of Diogenes both within, and outside the textual
and typographical boundaries of Diderot's dialogue illustrates and
materializes the mechanism of mise en abjme, which is the relation of
Diderot's Rameau's Nephew x.o Hegel's Phenomenologji of Spirit. As it turns
out, Diogenes reappears at the philosophical outskirts of Rameau's
embedded in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Indeed, Hegel's
discussion of Diogenes emerges midway through his employment of
quotes from and references to Rameau's Nephewf This focal point is
located directly in the middle of the Spirit chapter in the Phenomenology
of Spirit. Starobinski's interpretation of the Nephew's and the
Philosopher's references to Diogenes in terms of fictitious and cultural
Starobinski, "Diogtee dans LeNeveu de Ramem" 163. All translations from Starobinski by
Isabelle C. DeMarte.
Starobinski also speaks of Diogenes as being the geometric locus ("lieu geometrique") of
the philosopher and the Nephew. See his "Diog^e dans Le Nevm de Rameau," 147.
^ Hegel, Rhenomnologj! of Spirit, §524, 319.
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genealogy now takes on a new relevance—one which Starobinski
himself misses.®® Hegel fUls his philosophical gallery with literary
images. In a way that inversely reflects Hegel's gallery, Diderot's
literary dialogue frames two philosophical discussions of Diogenes:
The literary is embedded in the philosophical, the philosophical in the
literary.
Hegel's discussion of Diogenes follows the sections in which he
examines the language of flattery, and notes that the emergence of the
I coincides with the concomitant advent of torn consciousness and
culture.®' NeitherMo/norH»/recognizeshisownself-diremption. It is
rather the reader who observes this. The Nephew is stuck because he
has no way to transcend his position, while the Philosopher has the
option to do so. The Philosopher is in a position to talk about the way
things are, and in a position to say that what actually exists is not yet
rational. Although Hegel wiU claim that the rational is real and the real
rational, in this case the real of presently existing conditions is not yet
rational. The Nephew understands how society works. He perceives,
expresses, and embodies his society. Nevertheless, he does not
understand that his societyis contingent. He thinks that all societies are
the same all the time, but does not understand that societies are different
and his society wiU soon be different. However, the Philosopher is also
stuck. Unable to indicate how society could transcend its present
circumstances, all he can say is that it is not how it ought to be.
The point is not to live without taking a position, as the
Philosopher asserts, but rather to live in a way that the positions are not
self-alienating (neither in fact nor as experienced), but instead are modes
of self-expression (both in fact and as experienced). For Hegel, Uving
in a tub is still taking a position, playing a pantomime.'" This is not
made explicit in Diderot's text, but it is still true. Diogenes' style of life
is a response, a reaction, to his society and its values. Insofar as his claim
to live like a dog has any merit, he lives like a domesticated dog. Wild
dogs run in packs and are predators; Diogenes lives alone and subsists

Starobinski, "Diogene dans IjNeveu de 'Rameau" 147.
See Hegel, Rhenomenolog of Spirit, §517, 313.
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §524,319: "Should the plain mind demand the dissolution of
this whole world of perversion, it cannot demand of the individual that he remove himself
from it, for even Diogenes in his tub is conditioned by it, and to make this demand of the
individual is just what is reckoned to be bad, viz. to care for himself qua individual."
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on handouts. Diogenes maintains that people
live like dogs. In
making a claim about what people should do, Diogenes takes a
position. That is to say, he takes part in the pantomime. Unlike
Diogenes, dogs do not make points. They make no claims about what
ought to be done. They just make do.
Moderator. I'm sorry, but I must ask that you stop at this point.

^ ACT II, SCENE 3, BEAT V ¥
I understand that I only have a few moments, so let me skip a bit and
move to the section that deals with Hegel's discussion of the disrupted
and pure consciousnesses. Hegel writes:
The disrupted consciousness is only in itself, or implicitly the
self-identity of self-consciousness, a fact that is known to us,
but not to itself Thus, it is only the immediate elevation of
itself, an elevation it has not yet accomplished within itself,
and it still has within it its opposite principle by which it is
conditioned, without having become master of it through the
movement of mediation.'^
In Rameau'sNephew, the narrator andMo? are the same agent, although
at two successive moments. Hence, the narratological scheme of
Diderot's dialogue articulates in the telling of the story, at the juncture
between the narrated and the narrating, what Hegel outlines in the
quote above as an essentially narrative scheme in what he calls "the
movement of mediation."
In Rameau's Nephew, the narrator portrays the Nephew as "the
disrupted consciousness." The Nephew himself gives groimds for this
portrayal, as he rhetorically puts it to the Philosopher at his penultimate
remark in the dialogue: "Isn't it true that I am still the same?"^^ The
Nephew embodies tom consciousness as true-to-itself ("stall the
same"). He is an inherently contradictory being, a "compound of
elevation and abjectness, of good sense and lunacy," and so he remains

" Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §527, 321.
® Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," 87.
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the one who "has no greater opposite than himself."'^ He is
conditioned and condemned to remain beneath self-mastery, because
the assurance of his "self-identity" ("Am I still the same?") requires
validation from his counterpart through the latter's "mediation" ("Yes,
unfortunately"). The chronological "movement of mediation" takes
place and arises after the final period, after the end of the dialogue. For
the reader, it arises out of that period, at the end of the conversation
between the Philosopher and the Nephew, which fuses with—and so,
con-fuses—the end of its narrative. The Philosopher sajs nothing in
response to the Nephew's final provocation that "he laughs best who
laughs last."^'* Nevertheless, there is a response, albeit an implicit one.
This response is not within the text. Rather, the response is the text,
Rameau's Nephew, itself. The response is postponed until after the
conversation, when the Philosopher retrospectively narrates that
conversation of Moi and IMU
In the Phenomenohgt of Spirit, Hegel inserts the Philosopher's
description of the Nephew's character and Mofs portrayal of I^/s
pantomimes. However, Hegel neither provides their context, nor states
who says them. More precisely, Hegel leaves it to the readers to
recognize that the materid quoted from Diderot's dialogue is mediated
through a double point of view: On the one hand, through the
Philosopher's perception of the Nephew during the conversation; on
the other hand, through the narrator's transfiguring that perception
into a story.
Through this procedure, Hegel forces the
phenomenological observer to play the role ofMo/ the Philosopher, the
"pure consciousness."'^ In so doing, Mais concluding silence is
recapitulated within the phenomenological observer, and the narrator's
story—^which will have been Rameau'sNephew—^is embedded within the
Phenomnologj! of Spirit.
This suggests two remarks. First, it underscores that Moi,the pure
consciousness, has no more become a 'master' of himself than has JLui,
the disrupted consciousness. Rather, the former takes on a position
similar—^if posterior—to that adopted by the latter, as described by
Hegel. Hence, the Philosopher (pure consciousness) displays the

Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," 8-9.
" Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," 87.
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §527, 321.
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symptoms of the Nephew (disrupted consciousness). Second, the
absorption of Moz's silence within the phenomenological observer
tacitly reproduces the focal points that references to Diogenes provide
in ^mean's Nephew and the Phenomenolo^ of Spirit. Better still, Hegel's
embedding of the narrator's story simultaneously sublates laughter,
cynicism, and mise en abjme?^
Moderator. I really must insist that you stop now.

¥ EPILOGUE: L'ESPRIT D'ESCALIER ^
We consider the creation of the polyphonic novel a huge step
forward not only in the development of novelistic prose, that
is, of all genres developing within the orbit of the novel, but
also in the development of the artistic thinkingoih\im2S\kkyd.
It seems to us that one could speak directly of a special
polyphonic artistic thinking extending beyond the bounds of the
novel as a genre. This mode of thinking makes available
those sides of a human being, and above aU the thinking
human consciousness and the dialogic sphere of its existence,which are
not subject to artistic assimilation from monolo^cpositions?^
HE: That last talk was awfully long.
SHE: Yes, and you nevet got your cookie, poor thing.
HE: At least the third talk was canceled.
SHE: It's sad, in a way, that the moderator had to cut off the last speaker before her paper
was finished. There were several points that weren't sufficiently developed, and I would
have Uked to hear how she followed through with them.
HE: I'm not sure what points you mean. The paper seemed fine to me.
SHE: Naturally, it seems fine to you. You're a sweet dear. Let me play the Enlightenment
to your Dark Ages.
HE: That's not kind.

"• Laughter, a staple of the Cynics' pedagogical accoutnmnt, inscribes distance in the text.
Laughter is a reaction to, and therefore a distance from, that which provokes it. By
constimting a hinge between two inherently distinct moments and levels of the text—the
narrated and the narrating—laughter creates the oppormnity for a narrative.
" Bakhtin, Probkms of Dostoevski's Poetics, 270.
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SHE: No. Recall that
ends with L«; claiming that "he laughs best who
laughs last."
Nevertheless, it leaves undecided whether Mot or L«i—or both, or
neither—^has the last laugh. In her paper, the speaker didn't say who has the last laugh.
HE: So? She argued that neither the Nephew nor the Philosopher ultimately wins, didn't
she? Wouldn't it follow that neither has the last laugh?
SHE: It's nice that you try to play the Renaissanceoccasionally. If neither Mot n or Lttihzs
the last laugh, though, that su^ests that there never is a /ast laugh, only the next one.
HE: In that case, I don't see how Rameau's Nephew can be a mise en al^me of the
Vhenomenolog^ of Spirit. Diderot's dialogue seems open, but Hegel's text is closed. As a
result, wouldn't Sophocles' Antigone be a better candidate of the mise en ahyme of the
Phenomenologj! of Spirit}
SHE: From the Dark Ages to the Renaissance, and now Antiquity. Gosh, you're spastic.
And wrong. Antigone obviously couldn't he a mise en alyme.
HE: It's not obvious to me why...
SHE: The Dark Ages have returned. Consider two points. First, the speaker argued that
the Phenomenology of Spirit isn't closed, but that it's as open as Rameau's Nephew. Second,
since that's so, then Antigone can't be the mise en abjme of the Phenomenolo^ of Spirit since
Antigone itself is closed.
HE: How so?
SHE: Because, unlike Diderot's dialogue and Hegel's book, Sophocles' play ends with the
comprehension of the lesson. I don't suppose that you remember the concluding lines of
the chorus.
HE: As a matter of fact, I do:
Wisdom is supreme for a blessed life,
And reverence for the gods
Must never cease.
Great words, sprung from arrogance.
Are punished hy great blows.
So it is one learns, in old age, to be wise.^"''
SHE: There's no such final comprehension to be found in Rameau's Nephew.
HE: Well, bigwhoop! But the Phenomenology of Spirit conriludies with the chapter on Absolute
Knowing. Doesn't this prove that Hegel thinks there's a last laugh?
SHE: Au contrairel Absolute knowing occurs when we finally realize that there will always
be a next laugh, although never a last one. This applies as much to Hegel's spirit as it does
to Diderot's characters.
HE: Is that the way Diderot shows us how to interpret Hegel?
SHE: That's the idea.
HE: Rjimeau's Nephew is told by the Philosopher in retrospect, after his conversation with
Lni. Does that hook up with the endingof the Phenomenology of Spirit,when spirit recollects
the shapes of consciousness it passed through?
SHE: Exactly so.
HE: In each case, then, is the final period a hinge that opens the work, rather than the
terminal punctuation point?
SHE: Not bad. The end is the beginning.

" Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," 87.
"Jeffrey A. Gauthier is thanked for this suggestion.
Sophocles, Antigone, Paul Woodruff, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
2001), 58, U. 1348-53.
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HE: The start of something new?
SHE: That's right.
HE: Always a next laugh?
SHE: Precisely.
HE: There's always hope?
SHE: Sure.
HE: Maybe a yes behind the no?
SHE: Where are you going?
HE: I won't know until I've arrived.
SHE: You should know by now, there's no destination.
HE: Just way stations?
SHE: That's it.
HE: Should I stop?
SHE: That's not possible.
HE: Or desirable?
SHE: I didn't say that.
HE: You implied it
SHE: That depends on your theory of entailment.
HE: It's a nice theory.
SHE: I suppose it is.
HE: Would you like me to explain it?
SHE: How many martinis will that take, three?
HE: Just one.
SHE: A dialectical one, no doubt, that wiU necessitate another. Alk:(.. .mlsec!

William A. Rottschaefer is thanked for useful comments.

